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  • Povijest zagrebačkog nogometa
    Evo članka Bogdana Cuvaja (Povijest sporta, br. 36, 1978. g.) o četiri zagrebačka kluba koja su nosila ime grada Zagreba.

    Riječ je o Hrvatskom sportskom klubu Zagreb, Hrvatskom tipografskom športskom klubu Zagreb, Športskom klubu Zagreb i Fiskulturnom društvu Zagreb.

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  • 1.HNL - 14.kolo - Dinamo Zagreb - Rijeka - 23.11.2024. - 17.45h, Stadion Maksimir, Zagreb
    Long story short. Jedna od najlošijih tekmi ove sezone. Užasno smo odigrali.

    Iskreno, uopće me ne zanima LP. Daj mi te Lokomotive, Belupa, Gorice...

    Ovo je za zaborav bilo. Ajmo dalje.
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    Odlično si ovo sažeo.

    Mene samo zanima je li gospon Pandur objasnio Krušelju kako je Mamić stizao do onih policijskih dosjea kojima je par puta javno mahao na presicama?
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač
    AGM je izgleda riješio bug u web shopu i može se knjiga dodati u košaricu. Pa navalite ljudi! :smile:
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    Ma sarkastičan sam. :smile:

    Slažem se sa svime kaj si rekao.
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    A Krušelj je ovo saznao od Mamića? :lol:
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    Ok. Dakle može se zaključiti da je knjiga Antolićeva žalopojka?
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    Daj nam malo detalja. Malo mesa. Daj neku detaljniju recenziju napiši.
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač
    Evo priča o Bukoviju i Građanskom u kontekstu nogometne taktike. :smile:

    https://www.zonadinamo.com/discussion/comment/547114
  • 1. HŠK Građanski Zagreb
    Evo priča o Martonu Bukoviju i njegovom utjecaju na razvoj nogometne taktike iz knjige Jonathana Wilsona The Names Heard Long Ago: How the Golden Age of Hungarian Soccer Shaped the Modern Game. Razlog zašto ovaj tekst stavljam ovdje je taj što je priča većinski ispričana upravo kroz Bukovijev mandat u Građanskom. Građanski je bio taj preko kojeg se Bukovi afirmirao kao trenerski genijalac.

    U tekstu ima jako zanimljivih dijelova. Od toga kakav je Bukovi bio privatno, kakav mu je bio karakter, kakvo je bilo njegovo viđenje važnosti nogometne taktike, kako je Liverpoolu prodao foru s lažnom taktikom 1936. godine kada smo pregazili Engleze petardom usred Zagreba (Englezi su naime iz tadašnjih natpisa zagrebačkih športskih listova zaključili kako će Purgeri zaigrati engleskim stilom, a kad ono Bukovi ih je šokirao talijanskim stilom), od toga kako je u Dinamu 1946. godine implementirao koncept lažne devetke u utakmici protiv Lokomotive (utakmica za naslov prvaka Zagreba), pa sve do dijelova o njegovom privatnom životu (čak i o tome koliko je zavolio Zagreb i Hrvate zbog tadašnje borbe protiv srpskog hegemonizma). U tekstu se nalazi i poznata priča o tome kako je osobno štitio i čuvao čuvara igrališta u Koturaškoj židovskog podrijetla Reisfelda od ustaškog progona.

    Njegov utjecaj na razvoj našeg Dinama, našeg Građanskog, je nemjerljiv. Poznata je njegova izjava "Volim Purgere kao svoje dijete. Zavolio sam Građanski i Zagreb.".
    Nevjerojatno je da taj čovjek još uvijek nema svoju ulicu u Zagrebu (barem koliko je meni poznato). Nevjerojatno. Što se čeka? Jesu li postojale takve inicijative?

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  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    Je. Jer Bukovi je jedan od najznačajnijih nogometnih trenera u povijesti. Općenito je ta mađarska (srednjoeuropska) škola nogometa imala izuzetno bitan utjecaj na razvoj nogometne igre.

    U knjizi The Names Heard Long Ago: How the Golden Age of Hungarian Soccer Shaped the Modern Game donosi Bukovijeva sjećanja o tome kako je došao u Zagreb, zašto su ga zvali iz Građanskog, o taktici koju je igrao, o igračima itd. Pa pogledaj ako te zanima. Budem probao okačiti dijelove te knjige na forum, pa da ostane u našoj “zonaškoj arhivi”. :smile:
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač


    Izdavač te knjige je AGM. Tako da se može naručiti online preko njihovog web shopa.

    https://www.agm.hr/hr/shop/imamo-dinamo,1140.html
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač
    Čitam Ćirina sjećanja na 1982. godinu u novoj knjizi. U jednom od njih spominje i telefonski poziv Jonathana Wilsona, autora dosta popularne knjige Inverting The Pyramid: The History of Soccer Tactics, kojeg je zanimalo Ćirino viđenje 3-5-2 sustava kojeg je Dinamo igrao te šampionske godine.

    Uglavnom, prilažem ovdje tekst o tome iz Wilsonove knjige (ako ikog uopće to zanima). Da, naš Dinamo se nalazi u jednoj od najpoznatijih knjiga o povijesti nogometne taktike. Pa se netko čudi kaj su strani zaljubljenici u nogometnu igru jako dobro upoznati s našim Dinamom i njegovom poviješću.

    Dinamo je velik!

    Izvor Jonathan Wilson, Inverting The Pyramid: The History of Soccer Tactics, poglavlje 16. (The return of the back three):

    Yet Argentina weren’t the only side in Mexico to play with a back three. Bilardo’s interpretation of the system and his use of a playmaker within it may have been unique, but adding a third central defender wasn’t.
    There are those who insist the 3–5–2 was the creation of Ćiro Blažević at Dinamo Zagreb, foremost among them Ćiro Blažević. Even in his seventies he remained exhaustingly energetic, foul-mouthed, and hilarious, a man who had at least one opinion about everything and had no qualms about expressing it. “My son, let me tell you the truth,” he said. “3–5–2 was invented in 1982 by Ćiro Blažević.”
    Blažević was born in 1937 in the Bosnian town of Travnik. He was a Yugoslav youth champion in skiing and then became a right-winger for Dinamo Zagreb, Sarajevo, Rijeka, and the Swiss side FC Sion, where a knee injury brought his career to a premature end. He stayed on in Switzerland, working as a coach and supplementing his income by taking a job in a watch factory. One day in 1968, shortly after he’d been appointed coach of Vevey, an old woman found him sweeping out the locker room.
    “Why are you doing this?” she asked. “It’s not your job. You’re our head coach.”
    “Yes, I’m the head coach,” Blažević replied, “and one day I will become national coach of Switzerland.”
    The old woman laughed. “Yes, of course,” she said. “And one day, I will become Miss Switzerland.”
    Blažević, after stints at Sion and Lausanne, was right; the old woman wasn’t.
    He returned to Yugoslavia with Rijeka in 1979 and a season later took over a Dinamo Zagreb in decline. Blažević rejuvenated the squad and introduced an attacking style based on starting the game at a furious pace. They finished fifth, and then, as Blažević adopted a “lucky” white silk scarf, Dinamo won their first league title in twenty-four years. The following year, Dinamo lost out to Partizan in a three-horse race for the title but lifted the Yugoslav Cup.
    The move to 3–5–2 began, Blažević said, as soon as he arrived in Zagreb. “To make a decision on which formation and tactics to play, you have to take three factors into account. 1) The attributes of the players you have at your disposal. 2) Tradition. 3) Putting factors 1) and 2) into the current system of play. Only a poor coach comes to a new club and says, ‘I will play with this system’ without respecting the attributes of the players he has in his squad. Only a poor coach becomes a victim of a system.”
    It seems more likely, though, that the transition began in spring 1982. Most Yugoslav sides until then had tended at that point to play in the German style: a 4–3–3 with a libero and man-marking, and tactical discussion in the media was extremely limited (with the notable exception of Tomislav Ivić, although he tended to talk about pressing rather than shape). Two players, the creative forward Zlatko Kranjčar and the powerful center-back Ismet Hadžić, had just returned from compulsory military service. Blažević realized that with Hadžić back, he could get more out of the popular and technically gifted Velimir Zajec, a natural leader with a reputation for slapping underperforming players, who operated either as a libero or at the back of midfield, and he decided to deploy three men on the center of defense—Zajec as the libero, with Hadžić to his right and either Srećko Bogdan or Borislav Cvetković to his left. Gradually he replaced the full-backs, Zvjezdan Cvetković and Milivoj Bračun, with more attacking players, Petar Bručić and Drago Bošnjak, creating the 3–5–2.
    It was primarily a system designed to catch opponents by surprise. Again and again that season, Dinamo went a goal or two up in the opening twenty minutes as opponents failed to react to the unfamiliar shape. Bručić and Bošnjak pushed high, and Zajec had the freedom to carry the ball out from the back, knowing always that he had two men behind him as cover. Once they had the lead, Dinamo tended to drop deeper, the full-backs falling back to create a 5–3–2, looking to check the opposing wingers rather than push forward themselves.
    Blažević—of course, for no man is more sui generis than he and none more determined to be so—insisted the 3–5–2 was entirely his idea, calling Bilardo “a prick” for suggesting it was his idea. His story is that there was no evolution, that the formation leapt fully formed from his head: “I was never influenced by anybody.” Perhaps not, but Blažević was coming from a tradition that favored the libero; advancing the full-backs to become midfielders and withdrawing a central midfielder as a marker were logical evolutionary steps.
    Too opinionated and too restless ever to hold down a job for long, Blažević’s relationship with his directors deteriorated in his third season, and he moved on, returning to Switzerland with Grasshoppers. He won the title in the first of two seasons there, then wandered through Greece, Kosovo, Croatia, and France, winning a promotion with Priština and then the Croatian league and cup in a third stint at Dinamo. In 1994, as an independent Croatia was accepted into UEFA, he was the obvious choice to be national manager. Croatia reached the quarterfinal of Euro 96, losing to Germany, and then took a side still brimming with patriotic pride to the semifinal of the 1998 World Cup. “I’m not saying he was a bad coach or a great coach,” said the defender Slaven Bilić, who later became national coach, “but he was the ideal coach for us. He would gradually motivate you. He knows every day in his head that he’s going to make a small incident to wake everybody up a bit, and then he’s going to do this, then he’s going to tell them to go out to a nightclub.”
    Blažević tended always to be scornful of talk of systems and formations—unless, of course, he is emphasizing his own role in the creation of one. For him, compression and the manipulation of space are key. “Nowadays we speak more about concepts—an offensive style of play, a defensive style of play—than systems. Nowadays you have all the time the transformation of players. Players from the defensive line go forwards. Players from the offensive line go backwards and defend. Everything has become fluid. Everything takes place within a space of 30m: practically everybody has to play in every position and everybody has to know how to play everything.”
    He is aware too that the most carefully prepared tactical system is worth nothing if the players don’t have the faith in their manager to follow the game plan or if they lack motivation—and it is there that his real genius lies. “I spent the whole night thinking about theory,” he said of his preparation for the 1998 World Cup quarterfinal against Germany.


    I had a problem with [Oliver] Bierhoff, because I didn’t have a skilled player who could beat him in the air, so I had the idea of stopping the crosses coming in. I was thinking about telling the players the story about Rommel and Montgomery. Rommel was much, much better in strategy, but he didn’t have fuel. So the tanks couldn’t move and Montgomery wins.
    Then that morning, the guy who was with me said [the Croatia president Franjo] Tudjman was calling, and Tudjman said “Ćiro, you must win.” I was on my way to the dressing room with my theories, and there are a lot of mirrors in every dressing room. I looked at myself in the mirror and I was a kind of green colour. So I thought, “Oh my God, am I going to die?”
    I went to the room where the players were waiting for me—Šuker, Boban, Bokšić… and I had everything drawn on my paper, but I didn’t start to talk about anything. I couldn’t, because I was thinking was I going to die or not? I was looking at the players and there was silence in the dressing room, and after a few moments I saw that they were the same green colour as me.
    My theory was seven or eight minutes long, and I knew I wouldn’t be able to keep their attention so long. I didn’t start to talk about my theory. They were more and more green. So I crumpled my theories and threw them down, and after seven minutes I had said nothing about them. Fuck the theory. So I just said, “You have to go outside and die today for the Croatian flag and all the people who have given their lives.” No dealing with Bierhoff, nothing. And we won 3–0. You have to understand the psychology of the players. You have to have that sort of relationship with the team, so you can communicate your state of soul.


    P.S. Ali to nije sve. Osim Dinama, Wilson se u jednoj drugoj knjizi dotaknuo i prethodnika Građanskog koji je u svoje vrijeme pod Bukovijem igrao taktički revolucionaran nogomet. Okačim uskoro i to negdje na forum.
  • GNK Dinamo Zagreb kao nakladnik i izdavač
    Kupio sam danas knjigu Bilo je to najljepše proljeće u mom životu. Na prvi pogled, vrhunski odrađeno. Svaka čast. Čita se polako.