Ja uopce nisam ljevicar i idu mi na kurac te etikete koje zapravo koristis za difamaciju. A te politike EU provodi a dole ti je ekonomsko objasnjenje benefita. A ovo za mjenjanje drzave sam vise mislio na cinjenicu da je puno ljudi otislo. Ako si prije imao 20 ljudi s kojima mozes otic na tekmu, sad imas 5-6. Jesam ja sad manji Hrvat i Zagrepcan od tebe?
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lemons-problem.asp
Why something like ESG scores are efficient and inevitable in a free market.
Why do we have rating agencies? To understand this it helps to understand lemons.
George Akerof is most well known for being married to Janett Yellen, but despite being the second most well-known economist in his marriage, he received the Nobel prize for his paper on the market for “lemons” [http://wwwdata.unibg.it/dati/corsi/8906/37702-Akerlof%20-%20Market%20for%20lemmons.pdf ] ie used cars with questionable reliability. An unstructured market like this runs into problems when it has two features, the quality of a car is unobservable to the buyer, and the cost of supplying the car is increasing in the quality of the car.
When the buyers cannot observe the quality (read as value), they’re willing to pay the value they associate with a car of randomly drawn quality from the overall distribution. For a risk neutral buyer this is equal to the average quality (less if risk averse). This means that the seller of a higher quality car and one of a low-quality car can expect to sell at the same price. Now let's say that the costs associated with selling the highest quality cars are lower than that price, high quality sellers will exit the market, which lowers the average quality, and leads to a lower price. This then leads to more relatively high-quality sellers leaving the market, and the cycle continues, and can often lead the market to collapse.
To make things more concrete, let's say buyers are risk neutral, the quality of cars is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and the cost of supplying a car of quality Q is (3/4)Q (33% markups). When all cars are in the market, consumers are willing to pay 1/2 for a car of unobservable quality. Then its no longer profitable to sell a car of quality > 2/3, so these sellers exit and the average quality in the market falls to 1/3. Now consumers are only willing to play 1/3 for a car, and its no longer profitable to sell a car of quality > 4/9, so average quality falls to 2/9. If we keep iterating this process, we’ll get arbitrary close to an average quality of 0, and thus the only equilibrium is one where no cars are sold.
How do we resolve this issue? We need a way for buyers to get some information about quality. Both buyers and sellers would be on board for this type of resolution because buyers want to buy, sellers want to sell, and this isn’t possible without some kind of intervention. This explains why in the US car dealerships don’t put up much effort against things like “carfax” even though it weakens their negotiation abilities by giving the opposing party information. In financial markets rating agencies often fill this role. When these agencies are unbiased and accurate (rip 2008 CDOs) they work toward the benefit of the seller (a company raising capital) and the buyer (investors).
How does this relate to ESGs and climate friendliness? It’s fairly easy to argue that (all else hold constant), a company that’s more climate friendly has higher expected profit (and/or lower risk) than an identical company that is less climate friendly. One easy argument for this is that we expect a less climate friendly company to face cost increases from the direct and indirect effect of future climate regulations. Another is that the number of climate conscious consumers is increasing overtime. Either way being less climate friendly is a negative sign for future returns, and investors would like to price this in.
Since being more climate friendly is often more expensive, unless we can observe climate friendless, we are back in the lemons world.